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#2A-10/27/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF PUTNAM CASE NO. E-1242 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. CP-109 
COUNTY OF PUTNAM. 
Employer. 
WILLIAM D. SPAIN, JR.. ESQ.. PUTNAM COUNTY ATTORNEY 
(THOMAS F. PURCELL. ESQ.. DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY), for 
County of Putnam 
MARJORIE E. KAROWE. ESQ.. GENERAL COUNSEL, CSEA LAW 
DEPARTMENT, for Civil Service Employees Association. 
Inc. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These matters come to us on the exceptions of the County 
of Putnam (County) to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation, dated May 28, 1987, 
determining that Dotty Kraus, Fiscal Technician, and Betty 
Barrett, Coordinator of Special Projects, are not managerial 
employees as defined by §201.7(a) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act). Having so determined. 
Board - E-1242 & CP-109 
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the Director, upon stipulation of the parties and a finding 
of a community of interest, determined that the two positions 
should appropriately be placed in the unit represented by the 
Civil Service Employees Association. Inc. (CSEA). 
The two positions are both newly established. The 
County filed an application in Case No. E-1242 seeking their 
designation as managerial. CSEA filed a petition in Case No. 
CP-109 seeking clarification or placement of the two 
positions within its unit. 
Both Kraus and Barrett work in the Putnam County Office 
for the Aging and report to William Huestis. that office's 
Executive Director. As Fiscal Technician for the office. 
Kraus is responsible for drafting grant proposals seeking 
State and Federal monies to fund various programs 
administered by the office. Such proposals must meet the 
State and Federal guidelines. Each proposal is reviewed by 
the Executive Director prior to submission. She also 
participates in the preparation of the budget of the office. 
Barrett administers the office's Energy Conservation 
Program, which helps the elderly meet their energy needs. 
She reviews applications to determine eligibility and energy 
needs. She also instructs applicants in the completion of 
their applications. The Executive Director seeks her 
assistance for special projects. She also prepares grant 
applications. Huestis testified that he has utilized a 
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"management team" approach in his office. Both Kraus and 
Barrett have been part of his "management team". 
The County sought managerial designations solely upon 
the asserted policy-making responsibilities of Kraus and 
Barrett, there being no evidence that either employee 
performs any duties in the areas of negotiations, or contract 
or personnel administration. The Director determined that 
the duties of Kraus and Barrett do not warrant designation of 
their positions as managerial. 
In its exceptions, the County urges that the evidence 
establishes that both employees hold high-level positions 
having substantial discretionary responsibilities relating to 
the operation of their department. The County also urges 
that we give greater weight to the team management concept 
which is in place in the County's Office for the Aging. 
DISCUSSION 
At issue is the meaning of the phrase "formulate policy" 
as that term is used in §201.7(a) of the Act.— In City of 
Binqhamton. 12 PERB 1f3099, at p. 3185 (1979). we stated: 
A/"Employees may be designated as managerial only if 
they are persons (i) who formulate policy or (ii) who may 
reasonably be required on behalf of the public employer to 
assist directly in the preparation for and conduct of 
collective negotiations or to have a major role in the 
administration of agreements or in personnel administration 
provided that such role is not of a routine or clerical 
nature and requires the exercise of independent judgment." 
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To formulate policy is to participate with 
regularity in the essential process 
involving the determination of the goals 
and objectives of the government involved, 
and of the methods for accomplishing those 
goals and objectives that have a 
substantial impact upon the affairs and 
the constituency of the government. The 
formulation of policy does not extend to 
—the determination of^methods of—operation 
that are merely of a technical nature. 
In applying this statutory standard, only those employees 
who have a direct and powerful influence on policy 
formulation at the highest level will be determined 
managerial under the formulation of policy criterion. In 
our view, the record does not indicate that Kraus and 
Barrett participate in the determination of the goals and 
) objectives of the County at the highest level. While they 
have some discretionary responsibilities, their work must 
be viewed as determining methods of operation of a 
technical nature. While these two employees may be viewed 
by the Director of the office as part of his management 
team, that method of operation does not provide a basis for 
a managerial designation as that term is defined by the Act. 
ACCORDINGLY. WE AFFIRM the decision of the Director in 
all respects and ORDER that the County of 
Putnam's application in Case No. E-1242 be, 
and it hereby is. dismissed in its 
entirety, and that the petition of the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. 
) 
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in Case No. CP-109 be. and it hereby is, 
granted, and the two positions should be, 
and are, appropriately placed in CSEA's 
unit. 




STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WAVERLY ASSOCIATION OF SUPPORT PERSONNEL. 
Charging Party, 
=and= CASE NO. _U-.8_9.9-fl. 
WAVERLY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent. 
JOHN B. SCHAMEL for Charging Party 
R. WHITNEY MITCHELL for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on both the exceptions of the 
Waverly Central School District (District) and the 
cross-exceptions of the Waverly Association of Support 
Personnel (WASP) to the decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) which found that the District had violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) by unilaterally denying one employee (Edith Robbins. a 
bus driver) an unpaid leave of absence with benefits, but 
dismissing the charge in all other respects. 
The District's exceptions assert that the record fails 
to support the findings of the ALJ that Robbins had requested 
a leave of absence without pay but with fringe benefits, and 
j 
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that the request was denied by the District. The District 
alleges, therefore, that no unilateral change in Robbins' 
terms and conditions of employment occurred, and that the 
charge should have been dismissed in its entirety. 
WASP also filed exceptions to the ALJ decision, 
asserting that the ALJ erred in finding that after July 31, 
1986. when the parties executed a new agreement, no violation 
of the Act could have occurred since the new agreement 
covered the issue of leaves without pay. WASP alleges that 
the July 31 agreement neither covers the subject of leaves 
without pay with benefits, nor evidences a waiver of the 
right to negotiate such leaves; that the ALJ should have 
found that another employee (Sandra Dean, also a bus driver) 
requested and was improperly denied leave without pay with 
benefits after July 31; and that the ALJ erred in failing to 
afford monetary relief to Robbins, based upon the finding 
that Robbins was improperly denied such leave prior to 
July 31. 
The record establishes that a practice had indeed 
existed of granting leave without pay with benefits to 
employees of the District upon request. The record further 
establishes that in June and July 1986, negotiations were 
underway between the District and WASP, during which the 
issue of leave without pay was negotiated. It is also clear 
that on July 31, 1986 an agreement was reached between the 
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parties which established a new leave without pay provision. 
The leave without pay provision is without benefits, and 
limits the number of days to be granted, giving the 
Superintendent authority to approve absences of up to five 
days, and vesting authority to grant leaves of absence for 
longer periods in the Board of Education. In either event, 
these leaves without pay are to be without benefits, pursuant 
to the specific language of Article 9 of the parties' new 
agreement. 
We concur with the finding of the ALJ that the new 
collective bargaining agreement, effective July 31, 1986, 
covered the subject of leaves without pay, and that any 
failure to grant leaves without pay for any length of time, 
with or without benefits, following the July 31 agreement 
does not constitute a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
The charge was properly dismissed, therefore, insofar as it 
alleged that Dean was denied such leave with benefits in 
September 1986. following the effective date of the new 
agreement. 
We further find that the record establishes by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a unilateral change in 
terms and conditions of employment with respect to the 
granting of leaves without pay with benefits occurred prior 
to July 31, and with particular reference to Robbins. 
The District claims that, prior to July 31, Robbins did 
not make a request for a leave without pay, that there was no 
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denial of such a request, and therefore that no change in 
terms and conditions of employment occurred. However, the 
record supports the finding that such a leave was requested 
by Robbins and denied by George Porter, the District's 
Business Administrator and former Acting Superintendent of 
Schools, in a conversation occurring in mid-July, 1986.— 
There is no claim that Porter did not have the authority 
to grant or deny such leave requests, particularly in the 
absence of the Head Bus Driver, to whom such requests were 
normally addressed. 
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the record 
supports the ALJ's finding that Robbins requested and was 
denied a leave of absence without pay with fringe benefits 
prior to the execution of a new agreement between the parties 
and that this denial altered the practice concerning such 
leave that was in effect prior to the new agreement. It is 
well established that the granting of leaves of absence 
2/ 
without pay with benefits is mandatorily negotiable.— 
i^The respondent's exceptions are solely based upon a 
conversation between Robbins and Walter Cain, the 
Superintendent, which took place immediately following the 
Robbins and Porter conversation and fail to take note of 
Robbins' specific request to Porter. 
I/City of Albany. 7 PERB ir3078 (1974). 
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Accordingly, we find that a unilateral change in terms and 
conditions of employment took place, in violation of 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act.^ 
WASP alleges that the ALJ erred in failing to afford 
monetary relief to Robbins, in light of the finding that a 
violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act took place with respect 
to her leave request. However, the burden of proving damages 
rests upon the charging party, and the record fails to 
establish any entitlement to monetary relief. This is so 
because there is no evidence that the leave time requested by 
Robbins was for a period preceding July 31, when the parties' 
new agreement was negotiated. The decision of the ALJ is, 
accordingly, affirmed in this regard also. 
We have considered the remaining exceptions raised by 
each of the parties and these are denied based upon the 
reasoning set forth in the ALJ decision. 
Based upon the foregoing, the ALJ decision is affirmed 
in its entirety, and it is hereby ORDERED that: 
1. The District cease and desist from refusing to 
negotiate in good faith with WASP concerning terms 
and conditions of employment; and 
l/wappinqers CSD. 18 PERB ir3039 (1985). 
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2. The District sign and post the attached notice at all 
locations customarily used to post communications to 
unit members. 
DATED: October 27. 1987 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 




THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and In order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
* ™ all employees in the unit represented by the Waverly 
Association of Support Personnel that the Waverly Central School 
District: 
1. Will negotiate in good faith with the Waverly 
Association of Support Personnel concerning terms 
and conditions of employment. 
WAVERLY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated By {Representees) (Tltlt) 
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This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2010/27/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOANNE ROONEY, 
Charging Party, 
and- CASE NO.- U-^ -9143 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC.. LOCAL 102, 
Respondent. 
ROY J. LESTER, ESQ., for Charging Party 
MARJORIE E. KAROWE. ESQ.. for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Joanne 
Rooney (charging party) to a decision of the Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) which dismissed her charge alleging that the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 102 (CSEA) 
violated §209-a.2(a) and (b) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it refused to process a grievance 
she had filed against her employer. The parties submitted 
the matter for decision on a stipulated record. 
FACTS 
The charging party was a seasonal employee of the Long 
Island State Park and Recreation Commission. Her position 
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is included within the Operational Services Unit of the State 
of New York and was subject to the provisions of the 
collective bargaining agreement between the State of New York 
and CSEA applicable to that unit. On August 17, 1986, she 
was discharged from her position. She retained an attorney, 
who filed a grievance on her behalf. The employer rejected 
the grievance because, among other reasons, the grievance 
procedure under the State-CSEA collective bargaining 
agreement is not available to seasonal employees. That 
agreement provides that the disciplinary grievance procedure 
applies, among others, to employees who "have completed at 
least one year continuous service in the State classified 
service". 
After the grievance was rejected by the employer, the 
charging party, through her attorney, asked CSEA to represent 
her at later stages of the grievance procedure. CSEA advised 
her attorney that it could not represent the charging party 
since the grievance procedure was not available to seasonal 
employees such as she. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge in its entirety. He 
determined that there were no facts in the record to support 
a claim that CSEA's treatment of her grievance was 
irresponsible, grossly negligent or improperly motivated. He 
also determined that, insofar as the charge might raise a 
claim that the contract provision limiting the availability 
of the grievance procedure to those employees with one year 
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of continuous service violated the Act. the charge should be 
dismissed since agreement to contract terms more favorable to 
some employees than to others is not a per se violation of 
the Act. Finally, he held that individual unit members lack 
standing to prosecute an alleged violation of §209-a.2(b) of 
the Act. 
In her exceptions, the charging party argues that the 
ALJ erred in finding that she sought CSEA's representation 
only after her grievance had been filed and denied at the 
early stages of the grievance procedure. She also urges that 
the one year of continuous service requirement in the 
State-CSEA contract discriminated against her and was a 
violation of CSEA's duty of fair representation. 
DISCUSSION 
We construe the charge as alleging that CSEA violated 
its duty of fair representation 1) by refusing to process a 
grievance on behalf of the charging party regarding her 
discharge, or 2) by negotiating a contract with the State 
containing a disciplinary grievance procedure which was not 
available to seasonal employees, i.e.. employees who have not 
been employed for at least one year of continuous service. 
We affirm the ALJ's holding that CSEA did not breach its 
duty of fair representation when it refused to process 
charging party's grievance. The record amply supports the 
ALJ's finding that the charging party did not request CSEA to 
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represent her in the filing and initial processing of the 
grievance.— After the grievance had been denied at the 
early stages of the grievance procedure, however. CSEA was 
asked, and declined, to process the grievance further. CSEA 
advised the charging party that, as a seasonal employee, she 
had no right under the contract to utilize the grievance 
procedure. There is no basis in this record to dispute that 
interpretation of the contract. The record is clear that 
CSEA investigated the grievance, reached a reasonable 
judgment that the contract language did not support the 
grievance and promptly so notified the charging party. There 
is no evidence in this record that CSEA's conduct was 
2/ irresponsible, grossly negligent or improperly motivated.— 
Charging party's alternative allegation, and the main 
thrust of her exceptions, is that by negotiating a contract 
with the State containing a disciplinary grievance procedure 
that was not available to seasonal employees. CSEA violated 
its duty of fair representation. Charging party asserts 
that, by agreeing to deny seasonal employees the protection 
.i/Accordingly, we reject charging party's exception 
addressed to this finding. 
•^Faculty Association of Hudson Valley Community 
College. 15 PERB ir3080 (1982); Civil Service Employees' 
Association (Kandel), 13 PERB 1P049 (1980); Brighton 
Transportation Association. 10 PERB 1f3090 (1977). 
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of the grievance procedure. CSEA has unfairly discriminated 
3/ 
against her in violation of §209-a.2(a).— 
We have previously held that the duty of fair 
representation does not preclude an employee organization 
from reaching agreements in negotiations that are more 
4/ favorable to some unit employees than to others.— The 
bargaining agent must be given broad discretion in balancing 
the interests of the unit. It would, however, be a breach of 
its duty of fair representation if such agreements were the 
result of irresponsible, grossly negligent or improperly 
5/ 
motivated conduct.— There is no evidence in this 
stipulated record of such conduct. Rather, the evidence 
supports the conclusion that the inclusion in the contract of 
a requirement of one year's continuous employment as a 
prerequisite to the use of the contractual disciplinary 
3/TO the extent that the charge herein can also be 
construed as alleging that CSEA failed in its duty to 
bargain in good faith in violation of §209-a.2(b) of the 
Act, by virtue of its agreement to exclude seasonal 
employees from the grievance procedure, the ALJ properly 
dismissed that aspect of the charge. Individual unit 
members lack standing to prosecute such a violation. 
United Federation of Teachers (Goldrich). 17 PERB 1P015 
(1984); State of New York (Robinson), 13 PERB ir3063 (1980). 
^United Federation of Teachers (Kauder). 18 PERB 
«ir3048 (1985); State of New York. 14 PERB ^3043 (1981); 
Plainview-Old Bethpaqe CSD. 7 PERB 1P058 (1974). 
•^See Plainview-Old Bethpaqe CSD. supra. 
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grievance procedure was the result of the normal give and 
take of good faith negotiations. Accordingly, we determine 
that CSEA did not breach its duty of fair representation. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the ALJ and 
ORDER that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: October 27. 1987 
Albany, New York 
^ ^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DOWNSVILLE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, 
NEA/NY. 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8 933 
DOWNSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
ROBERT E. CLEARFIELD. ESQ. (JANET AXELROD, ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
ANTHONY MASSAR. for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Downsville Central School District (District) from an 
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision which found that 
the District had violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by refusing to negotiate 
a demand made by the Downsville Teachers' Association, NEA/NY 
(Association) that the District apply for Excellence-In-Teaching 
(E.I.T.) funds, consisting of State monies made available 
to school districts solely for the purpose of improving 
teachers' salaries. The ALJ found that the decision to 
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i 
apply for E.I.T funds is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation, and that the District had refused to negotiate 
the application for such funds with the Association, 
following the Association's demand that it do so. That the 
District made a unilateral determination not to apply for 
E.I.T. funds is not in dispute. 
By decision dated October 13. 1987. this Board, in 
Elmira City School District. 20 PERB 1P054 (1987), held 
that the decision to apply for E.I.T. funds is indeed a 
mandatory subject of negotiation upon the following 
grounds: first, the decision to apply for E.I.T. funding 
(which is specifically and exclusively intended for 
. ..) improvement in teacher salaries) directly and materially 
affects terms and conditions of teachers' employment; 
second, the New York State Legislature, in enacting 
§3602(27)(a) of the Education Law to authorize E.I.T. 
funds, expressed no intent to exclude the subject of 
applying for E.I.T. funding from bargaining; and. finally, 
because the application for E.I.T. funds does not relate 
primarily to the employer's mission, there is no 
articulated public policy which weighs in favor of 
declaring the decision to apply for such funds to 
constitute a management prerogative, notwithstanding its 
effect on terms and conditions of employment. 
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Our decision in Elmira City School District is 
dispositive of the issue of whether the duty to negotiate the 
application for E.I.T. funding is mandatory. Accordingly, we 
deny the District's exceptions relating to the ALJ's finding 
that such a duty exists. 
The remainder of the District's exceptions relate to the 
question of whether the Association made a demand to 
negotiate the application decision and whether the District 
rejected such demand. 
The ALJ found that the Association met its burden of 
proving that it made a demand to negotiate the application of 
E.I.T. funds, based upon two related communications. The 
first communication consisted of a brief conversation between 
the Association's President. Arthur Merrill, and District 
Superintendent Weston Hyde in April 1986. when Merrill stated 
to Hyde that "we would have to look at E.I.T. funds, this was 
another issue we were going to have to discuss and 
negotiate." Hyde's response was that he "was waiting [for] 
the guidelines from the Commissioner [of Education] before we 
could proceed with any further discussion." 
Thereafter, on May 8, 1986. Merrill wrote the following 
memorandum to Hyde and the Board of Education: 
On behalf of the Downsville Teachers' 
Association I request that negotiations be 
opened to determine payment of 
"Excellence-In-Teaching" (categorical aid) 
to the faculty of Downsville Central School. 
11279 
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We would be available to meet at the 
earliest possible mutually agreeable date to 
initiate the negotiations. 
Although, on May 8. the Board of Education met at its 
regularly scheduled meeting and reviewed the memorandum from 
Merrill, the—memorandum was—befror-e-the Board—f-^-r—i-n-f-o-r-ma-t-i-o-n-
purposes only, and not for any action. Accordingly, no 
response was made at that meeting to Merrill's demand for 
negotiations. 
Thereafter, on June 13. 1986. Hyde issued a written 
response to Merrill's May 8 demand for negotiations, as 
follows: 
The Board of Education last evening gave 
further consideration to your request on 
behalf of the Downsville Teachers 
Association to open negotiations regarding 
the distribution of the "Excellence-In-
Teaching" monies. The Board decided that 
it will not make application for this money. 
I will be most happy to sit down with you 
and discuss, in detail, the reasons for 
this decision. Please see me at your 
earliest convenience so that we might 
establish a mutually agreeable time for 
this to occur. 
We concur with the finding of the ALJ that Merrill's 
May 8 letter is reasonably read as a demand to negotiate the 
whole issue of E.I.T. funds, encompassing within it a demand 
to negotiate both the application for and the distribution of 
such funds. If. as contended by the District, the 
Association had sought only to negotiate the distribution of 
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funds. Merrill's May 8 demand would have been not only 
premature (since no decision whether to apply for the funds 
at all had yet been made), but would have been superfluous as 
well, since an affirmative statutory duty is placed upon 
school districts to engage in separate negotiations with 
teacher representatives for the distribution of funds which 
have been received. A demand for negotiation of the 
distribution by the teacher representatives would not, 
therefore, be required. 
To the extent that the District asserts that the May 8 
demand was unclear and ambiguous, it had some responsibility 
to express its uncertainty as to the scope of the demand to 
the Association, so as to afford the Association the 
opportunity to clarify the demand, before taking any 
unilateral action in relation to the subject of "E.I.T. 
funds", which.is clearly covered by the demand. We do not 
construe the failure of the Association President, at the 
May 8 Board of Education meeting, to further describe and 
delineate his demand as fatal to the Association's claim 
since there is no evidence that he was asked to clarify the 
demand, and since the demand was accepted for informational 
purposes only and not for any action at that time. 
Furthermore, such clarification would normally take place in 
the context of negotiating sessions rather than in the 
context of a public Board of Education hearing so that the 
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Association's failure to volunteer clarification of the 
demand in that context was not unreasonable. 
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the Downsville 
Central School District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act when, 
by memorandum dated June 13. 1986 it rejected the 
Association's demand that the District negotiate whether to 
apply for E.I.T. funding, and the decision of the ALJ is 
accordingly affirmed.— 
In light of our findings, it is not necessary for us to 
reach or decide the District's remaining exceptions. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Downsville Central School 
District: 
1. Forthwith negotiate in good faith with the Downsville 
Teachers' Association, NEA/NY a decision to apply for 
the State aid apportionment provided by Education 
Law. §3602 (27) for the 1986-87 school year, and. 
upon demand, for subseguent school years for which 
such funding is available; 
i^The fact that, subseguent to the District's 
violation of the Act. an improper practice charge was filed 
which, as we find, mischaracterizes Merrill's demand to 
negotiate as a demand to "separately negotiate 
distribution", does not preclude the exercise of our own 
judgment as to the scope of the demand, and does not, 
contrary to the District's claim, constitute an admission 
of Merrill's intent to limit his demand, since it was 
prepared and submitted by another Association 
representative. 1 1 9 & 9 
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2. Sign and post the attached notice at all work 
locations ordinarily used to communicate with unit 
employees. 
DATED: October 27, 1987 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
r. 
Walter L. Eisenberg,/Member 
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APPENDIX 
NOTICE 10 ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and In order to effectuate the policies ol the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify
 a n employees represented by the Downsville 
Teachers' Association, NEA/NY, that the Downsville Central School 
District: 
(1) Will forthwith negotiate in good faith with the 
Downsville Teachers' Association, NEA/NY, a 
decision to apply for the State aid apportionment 
pursuant to Education Law, 3602(27) for the 
1986-87 school year, and, upon demand, for 
subsequent years for which such funding is 
available. 




This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date ol posting, and must not be alter 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOUTHERN ADIRONDACK SUBSTITUTE TEACHER 
ALLIANCE. NYSUT. AFT. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3187 
HADLEY-LUZERNE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Southern Adirondack 
Substitute Teacher Alliance. NYSUT. AFT. AFL-CIO. has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Unit: Included: 
JSxcludecL: 
All per diem substitute teachers and 
nurses issued a notice of reasonable 
assurance of continuing employment by 
the employer as defined in §201.7(d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act). 
-ALL-Oilieremploye es^of the employer 
FURTHER. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Southern Adirondack 
Substitute Teacher Alliance, NYSUT. AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 27. 1987 
Albany, New York 
/Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PINE BUSH CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer/Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3143 
SCHOOL AND LIBRARY EMPLOYEES UNION. 
LOCAL #74, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTER-
NATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 7, 1986, the Pine Bush Central School 
District (District) filed a petition seeking to fragment 
certain supervisory employees (central kitchen cook-
managers) from a bargaining unit of 38 cafeteria workers 
represented by the School and Library Employees Union, Local 
#74, Service Employees International Union. AFL-CIO (SEIU), 
which opposed the petition. By decision of the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director), 
dated April 3, 1987, the petition was granted,— the 
parties' stipulating that if fragmentation were granted, 
there should be a supervisory unit defined as follows: 
Included: Central kitchen cook-managers 
Excluded: All other employees. 
1/ 20 PERB ir4030 (1987). Neither party has 
appealed this decision. 
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Inasmuch as SEIU indicated a desire to represent such a 
unit, the Director allowed it to intervene and conducted a 
secret mail-ballot election among the employees in the 
"s"tlpura"te3—uTTrc-onr^ ep"teml3er"_2"8"; 1:987. The-two balTots 
cast rejected representation by SEIU. Accordingly, SEIU 
can not be certified as the bargaining agent for the above 
described supervisory unit and the question concerning 
representation raised by its intervention is dismissed. 
DATED: October 27. 1987 
Albany, New York 
.g^^Z^v 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
""> 
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